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Dr. Smith dies of an AIDS-related condition.1 Dr. Jones tests
positive for HIV antibodies.2 The hospitals that employed Drs.
Smith and Jones consult legal counsel to determine whether to dis-
close the physicians' HIV status to their former patients. The hos-
pital officials wish to prevent further harm from the physicians'
HIV exposure.3 The hospitals notify the physicians' decedents of
their intent to release the doctors' names and HIV status to former
t A.B. 1985, Wellesley College; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Chicago.
' Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") is a fatal disease that develops after
infection by the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"). See Centers for Disease Control
("CDC"), AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: 1988
Update, 38 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly Rpt Supp 4, 1 (May 12, 1989). An individual
may be infected with HIV but not have AIDS. A diagnosis of AIDS is made when a patient
tests positive for HIV antibodies and has an accompanying opportunistic infection or a can-
cer that characteristically attacks individuals with immune systems suppressed by HIV. A
person with HIV infection who does not manifest any of the infections or cancers typically
associated with AIDS, nonetheless has AIDS when her T-cell count (immune system cells
destroyed by the virus) decreases to 200 or fewer cells per cubic millimeter of blood. See
Mireya Navarro, AIDS Definition is Widened to Include Blood Cell Count, NY Times,
D21-D22 (Aug 8, 1991). See also Michael J. Clement and Merle A. Sande, Approach to the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, in William Kelley, ed, Textbook of Internal
Medicine 1789-96 (J.B. Lippincott Co., 1989).
' Though procedures exist to test for HIV directly, the standard HIV test reveals the
presence of HIV antibodies, thereby indirectly indicating the presence of HIV. See Timothy
Bishop, Introduction to HIV Testing (unpublished manuscript, on file with U Chi L Rev)
(details HIV tests and their reliability). See also CDC, Update: Serologic Testing for HIV-1
Antibody-United States, 1988 and 1989, 264 J Am Medical Ass'n 171 (1990). In 95% of
HIV-infected persons, positive antibody tests are found within six months of the date of
transmission. However, the length of the maximum window period between HIV infection
and HIV antibody presence is as yet undetermined. Robert Horsburgh, et al, Duration of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Before Detection of Antibody, 2 The Lancet 637
(1989).
The term "HIV-positive" refers to individuals whose HIV antibody tests reveal the
presence of HIV. "HIV-negative" refers to individuals whose HIV antibody tests do not
reveal the presence of HIV. As stated earlier, HIV-negative patients may still have HIV.
I The phrase "from the physicians' HIV exposure" is intentionally used instead of "po-
tential exposure to HIV". The negligence equation used throughout this Comment, B<P*L,
looks at the total cost of accidents (L) in the absence of cautionary expenditure and sepa-
rately factors in the probability (P) that the accident will occur. See text accompanying
notes 57-65.
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patients. Dr. Jones's and Dr. Smith's decedents sue to enjoin the
hospitals' intended releases.
In another scenario, an individual who tests positive for HIV
antibodies sues a hospital for negligence. In her suit, she claims
that she contracted the virus from a former patient, who had been
infected by the patient's physician, and seeks to discover the iden-
tity of the patient's physician.
These two scenarios are different sides of the same coin. In the
first, physicians or their families sue to prevent disclosure of their
identities, while a hospital seeks disclosure to avoid ultimate liabil-
ity.4 In the second scenario, a third party sues the hospital to ob-
tain an HIV-infected employee's name, while the hospital seeks to
protect its employee's privacy and avoid disclosure. To resolve
these disclosure issues, courts must establish a level of due care
that determines when hospitals must disclose the identity of HIV-
infected health care workers.
A recent case of alleged HIV transmission from a health care
professional5 to his patients has renewed interest in disclosure of
the HIV status of physicians. As a result of this single case,6 health
departments, hospitals and other medical institutions have insti-
tuted "lookback"7 policies, whereby they notify the former patients
of physicians who die of HIV-related conditions." A hospital's deci-
sion to perform a lookback may reduce the number of persons ex-
" A hospital may also wish to avoid the negative publicity that will likely result if the
information is eventually uncovered without the hospital having voluntarily disclosed it.
5 Although the preceding hypotheticals concern physician disclosure, this Comment is
relevant to health care workers generally. The CDC define health care workers as "persons,
including students and trainees, whose activities involve contact with patients or with blood
or other body fluids from patients in a health-care setting." Centers for Disease Control,
Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 Mor-
bidity and Mortality Wkly Rpt Supp 2, 3 (Aug 21, 1987).
6 See CDC, Possible Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient
During an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly Rpt, No 29, 489
(Jul 27, 1990). The CDC later revealed that five of the dentist's patients tested HIV-positive
and that the dentist likely had transmitted the virus to three of them. See CDC, Update:
Transmission of HIV Infection During Invasive Dental Procedures-Florida, 40 Morbidity
and Mortality Wkly Rpt, No 23, 377 (Jun 14, 1991). There are no other reported cases of
suspected HIV transmission from a health care worker to a patient.
7 The terms "lookback", "lookback notification", and "notification" are used inter-
changeably throughout this Comment.
8 For some examples of recent lookbacks performed by medical institutions, see Jean
Latz Griffin, Dental Student Has HIV, Patients Told, Chi Trib C1 (Jul 24, 1991) (dental
school notified patients that they had been treated by an HIV-positive dental student); Doc-
tor Died of AIDS, Hospital Tells Parents, NY Times A16 (Apr 11, 1991) (hospital notified
the parents of 59 patients that a medical resident had died of AIDS); and AIDS Doctor
Revealed, Newsday 16 (Jun 2, 1991) (hospital notified more than 5,000 patients of an ex-
staff anesthesiologist two weeks after he died from AIDS-related conditions).
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posed to HIV as a result of medical workplace exposures and may
also reduce the cost of the lawsuits that follow.
An economic analysis suggests that courts should require hos-
pitals to disclose their physician-employee's HIV status only if the
benefit in reducing expected accident costs is greater than the
costs of notification.9 In other words, hospitals should be allowed
or required to perform lookbacks when the cost of accidents pre-
vented by lookback, multiplied by the probability of an accident
occurring, exceeds the cost incurred as a result of lookbacks. This
Comment uses the basic Learned Hand formula B<P*LO to pro-
vide a legal framework for determining when hospitals" should be
allowed to carry out lookback notifications.
Section I discusses the current legal approaches to HIV status
disclosure in the health-care setting. Section II introduces the pro-
posed equation and explores the economic basis of the negligence
inquiry. Section III analyzes each variable in the equation and pro-
vides some guidance for assigning relative cost estimates. Section
IV interprets the equation and advises when and to what extent to
release the identity of HIV-infected health care workers.
I. BACKGROUND
Courts, legislatures, and medical institutions have participated
in lookbacks. An analysis of blood donor and lookback cases sup-
ports the cost-benefit model that this Comment proposes. The
model finds additional support in legislation that addresses look-
backs and the notification practices of medical institutions.
A. Caselaw
1. The donor cases.
The issues surrounding HIV status disclosure are familiar to
the courts. Many courts have resolved the disclosure issue by bal-
ancing the parties' competing interests. In particular, this issue of
lookbacks has been raised during discovery proceedings in litiga-
tion involving HIV transmission through blood transfusions. 2 In
' See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.1 at 149-50 (Little, Brown, 3d
ed 1986).
10 United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947).
" The term "hospital" is used for simplicity. This same formulaic evaluation should
apply to public health departments, individual practitioners, small medical groups, or any
other health care organization contemplating a lookback.
" Many commentators have discussed HIV-status disclosure in the context of HIV in-
fection arising from blood transfusions. See Richard C. Bollow and Daryl J. Lapp, Protect-
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six cases, state courts have used cost-benefit analysis to decide
whether to require disclosure of the identities of blood donors."
a) Preventing discovery. Two state courts have blocked
disclosure of blood donors' identities and denied discovery requests
using balancing tests. 14 In Rasmussen v South Florida Blood Ser-
vice, the plaintiff sought to discover the identities of fifty-one
blood donors after receiving an HIV-tainted blood transfusion.
The plaintiff sought to establish that he had contracted AIDS from
the HIV-infected blood. The court held, however, that the viola-
tion of the donors' privacy and the resulting "serious disincentive
to volunteer blood donation" outweighed the minimal probative
value of the discovery sought.'5 The Florida Supreme Court recog-
nized the "state's important interest in the fair and efficient reso-
lution of disputes," but believed that refusal to disclose the donors'
identities would provide "protective measures to minimize the im-
pact of discovery on competing privacy interests."' 16 In sum, the
court concluded that disclosure would have implicated the donors'
privacy rights under the United States and Florida Constitutions.17
Confronted with strikingly analogous facts,' 8 a New York
court also used a balancing test to deny discovery of donor identi-
ties, but on different grounds. In Krygier v Airweld, Inc, the court
expressly declined to address the donors' constitutional privacy ar-
gument. Rather, the court based its decision on the physician-pa-
tient privilege and society's interest in an adequate blood supply.' 9
The court concluded that "[e]xposing donors to public scrutiny in
order to determine what they may have told [the blood bank] has
only marginal utility in advancing the plaintiff's theory of liabil-
ing the Confidentiality of Blood Donors' Identities in AIDS Litigation, 37 Drake L Rev 343
(1987-1988); Karen Shoos Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J Legal Med 131 (1986); Note, AIDS: Anonym-
ity in Donation Situations- Where Public Benefit Meets Private Good, 69 B U L Rev 187
(1989); Note, Transfusion-Related AIDS Litigation: Permitting Limited Discovery from
Blood Donors in Single Donor Cases, 76 Cornell L Rev 927 (1991).
13 These six cases are discussed from a policy perspective in Note, 76 Cornell L Rev at
927 (cited in note 12).
" Rasmussen v Southz Florida Blood Service, 500 S2d 533, 535 (Fla 1987); Krygier v
Airweld, Inc, 137 Misc 2d 306, 520 NYS2d 475, 477 (1987).
Rasmussen, 500 S2d at 538 (quoting 467 S2d 798, 804 (1985)).
Id at 535.
17 Id at 537.
18 In Krygier, the blood bank was one of several defendants in a wrongful death action.
Plaintiff's decedent allegedly contracted AIDS in a transfusion following an industrial acci-
dent. The decedent's wife sought discovery of the donors' identity. Krygier, 520 NYS2d at
475.
1, Id at 477.
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ity."20 Thus, both blood donor cases preventing discovery involved
balancing tests.
b) Compelling discovery. Again using a balancing test, a
state appellate court upheld the lower court's order compelling the
hospital's disclosure of donor identities in a wrongful death action.
In Tarrant County Hospital District v Hughes,2 the plaintiff's
daughter contracted HIV through a blood transfusion. In response
to the plaintiff's request for the names and addresses of blood do-
nors, the lower court crafted a modified order that allowed discov-
ery of donors' names but directed the plaintiff to obtain a further
court order before contacting donors.22 In reviewing this order the
appellate court compared the state interest served by the order
with the donors' interest in privacy.23 The court concluded that the
discovery order did not violate the donor's right to privacy and
that the hospital failed to. show that the injury to society's interest
caused by disclosure outweighed its benefit.24
In three other blood transfusion cases, courts have allowed
limited discovery of donors while protecting their identities. The
court in Boutte v Blood Systems, Inc.,25 balanced the parties' com-
peting interests and held that the plaintiff could proceed with lim-
ited discovery, provided that (1) depositions included only written
questions and answers, (2) the donor could refuse to provide iden-
tifying information, and (3) the blood bank's counsel could secure
donor confidentiality. 26 In Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v
District Court, where a patient contracted the virus through a
blood transfusion, the Colorado Supreme Court allowed controlled
discovery of a single blood donor's identity, by limiting depositions
to a written questionnaire .2  Finally, the court in Mason v Re-
gional Medical Center of Hopkins County, allowed disclosure but
attempted to safeguard the donor's privacy by limiting disclosure
to one attorney on each side.28
The blood transfusion cases reveal that courts have generally
balanced donors' privacy interests against the plaintiffs' interest in
disclosure when deciding whether to permit discovery of donors'
20 Id.
" 734 SW2d 675 (Tex App 1987).
22 Id at 679.
23 Id.
'" Id at 680.
" 127 FRD 122 (W D La 1989).
26 Id at 126.
2-7 763 P2d 1003, 1013-14 (Colo 1988).
28 121 FRD 300, 304 (W D Ky 1988).
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identities. In cases involving lookback, courts must strike the same
delicate balance.
2. Litigated lookbacks.
In the United States, three cases 29 have specifically addressed
the disclosure of the identities of HIV-infected health care work-
ers. In Estate of Behringer v Medical Center at Princeton,0 plain-
tiff-decedent sued as a result of the defendant hospital's failure to
keep plaintiff's diagnosis and test results confidential. The plaintiff
worked for the defendant hospital as a physician. 1 When he fell
ill, Dr. Behringer checked into the defendant's medical center.32
Fearful that news of his diagnosis would destroy his professional
career, however, he checked out of the hospital shortly thereafter.33
Nonetheless, patient cancellations and inquiring phonecalls led
him to suspect that hospital employees had revealed the diagno-
sis. 34 Dr. Behringer charged the hospital with negligent failure to
assure his confidentiality, which, he asserted, damaged his profes-
sional reputation.35
The Superior Court of New Jersey held that the hospital neg-
ligently failed to keep Dr. Behringer's diagnosis confidential. The
court deemed the plaintiff's status as defendant's employee partic-
ularly relevant. The court found that "[b]ecause the stakes are so
high in the case of a physician being treated at his own hospital, it
is imperative that the hospital take reasonable steps to insure the
confidentiality" of the diagnosis.37 Moreover, the court discounted
defendant's possible competing interest in disclosure. Any balanc-
ing of interests clearly fell in favor of the physician. 8
Unlike the Behringer court, the Fifth Circuit in Leckelt v
Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. Ill allowed dis-
closure based on a balancing of interests that included the health
29 A fourth lookback case was litigated in England. In that case, a British health au-
thority sought an injunction against the defendant newspaper to prevent publication of the
HIV status of two physicians with AIDS. The court found that the physicians' privacy rights
outweighed society's interest in a free press. X v Y, 2 All E L Rep 648, 648 (1988).
30 249 NJ Super 597, 592 A2d 1251 (1991).
3' 592 A2d at 1255.
32 Id.
33 Id at 1256.
34 Id.
29 Id at 1268.
26 Id at 1273-74.
37 Id at 1272-73.
38 Id at 1273.
39 909 F2d 820 (5th Cir 1990).
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care worker's right to privacy. Kevin Leckelt was a licensed practi-
cal nurse at Terrebone General Medical Center, a government hos-
pital in Louisiana.40 The chairperson of the Medical Center's infec-
tion control committee alleged to the chief of staff that Leckelt was
an "associate" of an AIDS patient there. To comply with the HIV
and AIDS guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and the
American Hospital Association, the committee requested that
Leckelt disclose to it the results of a recent HIV antibody test.41
Convinced that Leckelt would not submit the test results, the
Medical Center terminated his employment for failure to comply
with its policies.42 Leckelt sued, arguing that the Medical Center's
disclosure requirement violated his civil rights under federal and
Louisiana constitutional and statutory provisions.43
In upholding the hospital's disclosure requirement, the court
weighed Leckelt's privacy interests against the Medical Center's
interest in knowing Leckelt's health status." The court found
Leckelt had a "diminished" privacy interest because he voluntarily
worked for a hospital that had standing policies requiring its em-
ployees to undergo medical testing "where necessary" and because,
by his own admission, Leckelt had already undergone HIV an-
tibody testing.45 The court held that Leckelt's diminished privacy
interest failed to overcome the Medical Center's fundamental in-
terest in protecting the health of its employees and patients. The
court compared the Medical Center's claim to an employer's inter-
est in a safe, efficient workplace-an interest that the Supreme
Court has deemed significant.46 Without relying on any expert tes-
timony, the court stated that "Leckelt's duties as a licensed practi-
cal nurse provided opportunities for HIV transmission. '47
Few other courts have faced the issue of disclosure of the iden-
tities of HIV-infected health care workers. In Doe v Federal Bu-
40 Id at 821.
41 Id at 822.
42 Id at 824.
11 Id. See Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC § 794 (Supp 1991); Louisiana
Civil Rights for Handicapped Persons Act, La Rev Stat §§ 46:2251 et seq (West, 1980); US
Const, Amend IV; and US Const, Amend XIV.
"' Leckelt, 909 F2d at 832-33. The court also considered Leckelt's charge of discrimina-
tion under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, id at 824-30, and his equal protection
argument based on membership in the class of handicapped persons. Id at 831-32. Both of
these arguments were rejected by the court. Id at 830, 832.
15 Id at 833.
46 Id, citing National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656, 671 (1989)
(holding that a warrant is not constitutionally required before the United States Customs
Service tests employees applying for specified positions for drug use).
41 Id at 833.
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reau of Prisons,48 an HIV-infected dentist who practiced at the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in Chicago sought to restrain the
Federal Bureau of Prisons from issuing a press release, posting no-
tices on bulletin boards at all federal prisons, and taking other ac-
tions that would reveal his identity and HIV-positive status. A
United States district court refused to issue a temporary re-
straining order and allowed the wide distribution of the dentist's
identity.
The courts that have considered public or limited disclosure of
HIV test results have provided neither a clear test nor a method
for resolving hard cases. In the blood transfusion cases, courts have
attempted, with conflicting results, to balance competing inter-
ests. 49 In lookback cases, courts generally have neither employed a
balancing test nor provided any other framework upon which to
decide future cases.50 Thus, the burgeoning issue of HIV transmis-
sion in health care settings awaits a rule that offers consistent and
predictable guidance in resolving disclosure conflicts. This Com-
ment's analytical model seeks to provide such a rule.5 1
B. Legislation
Current legislation concerning the rights and responsibilities
of patients and physicians may help determine whether lookbacks
will be performed as part of a hospital's general practice. At least
one state has enacted legislation that requires the state health de-
partment to consider notifying patients if their health-care pro-
vider has AIDS and has performed invasive procedures.2 Such
federal and state legislation may influence judges' evaluations of
the costs of disclosure, even if such costs are found not to be dis-
positive in the decision to conduct a lookback.
In addition to legislation specifically addressing lookbacks,
Congress has passed laws that effectively insulate persons with
48 No 91-C-5013 (N D III, Aug 9, 1991), discussed in 1991 AIDS Litigation Rep 6833
(Sep 13, 1991).
"' See Rasmussen, 500 S2d at 537 (denying discovery request); Tarrant, 734 SW2d at
679 (compelling discovery with a court order).
50 See, for example, Behringer, 249 NJ Super 597.
"1 This Comment focuses on lookbacks because they may be the most contested area of
HIV-status disclosure in the near future. Nevertheless, courts may apply the model offered
by this Comment to resolve other disclosure cases.
52 Act Relating to AIDS, 1991 Ill Advanced Leg Service 763, 1991 Pub Act 763, 1991 I1
Sen Bill 999. Note that there is some confusion as to the impact of this legislation given that
the Illinois Department of Public Health does not collect the names or professional informa-
tion of people infected with HIV until they receive a diagnosis of AIDS.
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HIV disease from discrimination based on disability. The Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("FRA")53 and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")5 4 reflect Congress's determination
that compensable damages arise from discrimination on the basis
of disability. Further, as argued below, 55 courts may use this legis-
lation to guide their evaluations of costs associated with discrimi-
nation, an important component of the total cost of a lookback.
This Comment explains the argument that lookbacks may consti-
tute a violation of the FRA, the ADA, or both. Moreover, under
the analytical model proposed, no actual violation of either the
FRA or the ADA is required to find that discrimination on the ba-
sis of disability represents a cost of lookback. 56
II. THE NEGLIGENCE EQUATION
Thus far, courts that have considered whether to disclose the
identity of HIV-positive health care workers have applied neither
consistent nor theoretically sound analytic methods. An acceptable
method would offer principled criteria to determine when disclos-
ure would be socially beneficial. Economic analysis of law provides
one such method for determining when notification efficiently pre-
vents future damage.
Specifically, this Comment proposes that courts adopt a negli-
gence standard for determining whether a lookback is or was ap-
propriate. Under such a standard, hospitals would be liable for in-
juries resulting from failure to conduct a lookback when the total
costs of notification are less than the total costs of non-notification.
Accordingly, hospitals would be liable for injury resulting from a
lookback when the total costs of notification are greater than the
total costs of non-notification. In sum, the standard should en-
courage hospitals to make efficient lookback decisions.
The negligence formula begins with the uncontroversial notion
that a self-interested patient would want to know the HIV status
of her physician before submitting to a medical procedure, 57 and,
based on principles of informed consent, that patient may have a
right to know.58 An informed patient would likely act on such
'3 Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC § 794 (Supp 1991).
" Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC §§ 12101 et seq (Supp 1991).
" See text accompanying notes 84-107.
6 See Section III.A.2.
57 See Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to
Know" The Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 Md L Rev 12, 23 (1989).
"' See Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Inva-
sive Procedures, 19 Hastings Ctr Rpt 32 (1989) (analysis of patient's right to know).
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knowledge by choosing a non-HIV-infected physician beforehand. 59
Therefore, lookback questions should arise only when the physi-
cian did not know she was HIV-infected or when she knew but did
not disclose that information to the patient. Thus the issue is
whether a lookback procedure, as performed by the physician's
employer, can ameliorate, after treatment, the costs of the physi-
cian's failure to disclose before treatment.
As in the cases of nondisclosure of the risks of medical proce-
dures,e0 courts in lookback cases should focus the negligence in-
quiry on the hospital rather than on the physician. As an em-
ployer, the hospital should ensure that no physician-employee
poses a material risk to patients.6 1 Further, in a practical sense, the
hospital is more likely to be responsive to claims raised by former
patients. By the time a lookback is considered, the HIV-infected
physician may be ill, insolvent, uninterested, or dead.
A negligence standard for lookback is consistent with custom-
ary judicial practice in that courts have traditionally employed a
negligence standard to determine liability in cases of nondisclosure
of risks of treatment.6 2 One of the most popular forms of the negli-
gence inquiry is the economic approach first formally advanced by
Judge Learned Hand. In the famous case of United States v Car-
roll Towing,63 Judge Hand proposed that courts set the standard
of due care in tort cases according to a simple economic equation.
The equation Judge Hand proposed is expressed as B<P*L.
The variable B denotes the cost of a precaution. P*L represents
expected accident cost as a function of the probability of the loss
occurring, were precaution not taken (P), multiplied by the magni-
tude of that loss (L). P*L is ultimately compared to the cost of B. 4
If B is less than P*L, it is negligent not to institute the precaution.
In the case of lookback, the cost of the precaution (B) is deter-
mined according to the economic cost of notification, the cost to
the physician, the cost to persons associated with the physician,
and the cost to society at large. The expected accident cost (P*L)
depends on the risk estimates of HIV transmission through physi-
'" Gostin, 48 Md L Rev at 23 (cited in note 57).
60 See, for example, Canterbury v Spence, 464 F2d 772 (DC Cir 1972).
61 Gostin, 48 Md L Rev at 14 (cited in note 57).
62 See Richard Prosser and W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 18 at 121,
§ 32 at 190-91 (West, 5th ed 1984).
63 See United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947).
A more detailed explanation with examples is provided in Posner, Economic Analy-
sis of Law at 147-51 (cited in note 9).
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cian exposure (P) multiplied by the magnitude of the marginal in-
crease in losses suffered if lookback is not performed.6 5
Where the patient has been exposed to HIV through contact
with an infected physician (that is, where the value of L is greater
than zero), some costs cannot be avoided with or without a look-
back. Performing a lookback in this instance will not change the
fact that the patient may have contracted HIV and as a result has
a significantly higher chance of testing HIV-positive in the fu-
ture.6  However, a lookback may reduce losses associated with the
initial transmission. Specifically, lookback and notification puts at-
risk patients on notice; it encourages the patient to seek testing for
HIV infection. If that patient turns out to be infected, the patient
may be able to seek early treatment and thus live longer than if
she was not aware that she had been infected. 1 In this sense, the
lookback decreases the magnitude of L to the patient. Addition-
ally, a lookback could eliminate significant losses arising from
transmission by the patient to third parties .6 The costs associated
with performing the lookback, B, should be compared to the
change in P*L given a lookback as compared to P*L were no look-
back performed.
III. EVALUATING THE EQUATION
To use the Hand formula in a lookback case, courts must eval-
uate the many factors that affect the variables B and P*L. This
section identifies judicially and legislatively recognized costs of dis-
closure, reviews existing information about the likelihood of HIV
transmission, and discusses the possibilities of reducing harm once
transmission has occurred.
' It may be easier to think of L as the negative of the benefits that a lookback gener-
ates if performed.
" Note that for the purposes of evaluating whether a lookback should be allowed or
required, P*L should include only secondary costs of exposure. That is, P*L equals the cost
of accidents without notification (Cm.), less the cost of accidents with the notification (C,),
where ((Ca,) - (Cd,)) > 0.
' See note 146 and accompanying text.
6 Ultimately P*L = n((Cwna) - (C)'+(Cwnb)), where n is the number of patients
treated by the HIV-positive physician, Cwna is the expected loss incurred by the patient
without lookback, C. is the expected loss incurred by the patient with the lookback, and
Cunb is the expected loss incurred by third parties exposed to HIV through interaction with
the patient.
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A. Cost of the Lookback
The cost of a lookback (B) must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Nevertheless, courts can often identify the types of
costs they must examine and their magnitudes.6 9 Courts should
start by considering the economic cost of actually searching the
physician's records, and locating and notifying patients. The courts
should also consider the privacy costs to the physician and physi-
cian's family.7° Depending on how the lookback is done and the
extent to which it reflects discrimination against the physician on
the basis of disability, B may also include costs of discrimination.
As noted above, courts' assessments of disclosure costs are, and
should be, guided by such legislation as the FRA71 and the ADA.7 2
Other guideposts include the damages courts award as compensa-
tion for emotional distress and loss of consortium arising from dis-
closure. This section sets parameters and offers guidance in deter-
mining the cost of lookback (B).
1. Significance of the right to privacy.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "the Constitution em-
bodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty
will be kept largely beyond the reach of government. ' 73 One funda--
mental element of the right to privacy is the ability to "avoid[]
disclosure of personal matters. ' 74 The protection from government
disclosure of personal information has been extended to a broad
range of intimate information.75 Information concerning a person's
Existing caselaw does not yet make clear which costs are judicially recognized in the
HIV status disclosure context. See, for example, Leckelt, 909 F2d at 820; Behringer, 592
A2d at 1251. The costs outlined in the text are the best approximations to date of the costs
courts should consider.
70 It is clear that courts recognize a privacy interest in information pertaining to HIV
status. See Doe v Borough of Barrington, 729 F Supp 376, 382 (D NJ 1990) (police officer
violated family members' privacy rights by disclosing citizen's HIV infection); Woods v
White, 689 F Supp 874, 876 (W D Wis 1988), aff'd, 899 F2d 17 (7th Cir 1990) (right of
privacy covers inmates' HIV status).
71 29 USC § 794.
72 42 USC §§ 12101 et seq.
" Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 US 747, 772
(1986) (state's law subordinating women's privacy right to abortion held unconstitutional).
7' Whalen v Roe, 429 US 589, 599 (1977) (upholding, against a privacy claim, a statute
requiring that official drug prescription forms identifying a patient's name be filed with the
state health department).
71 See, for example, Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425, 457 (1977)
(though holding that the seizure of presidential materials for screening by government ar-
chivists did not invade a former President's privacy rights, the court rigorously scrutinized
the safeguards designed to prevent disclosure of personal information); Detroit Edison Co. v
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health is of particular private and personal concern.71 In fact,
"[p]robably the largest category of cases in which a right of confi-
dentiality has been recognized includes challenges to governmental
demands for medical or psychiatric information about a person."
Courts have determined that information pertaining to HIV status
is "of the most personal kind."7
Therefore, when lookbacks are performed by government-run
hospitals, 79 the lookback might indeed violate constitutional pri-
vacy rights.80 Courts that recognize such a violation should con-
sider it as a heavy cost in the B<P*L inequality, so costly as to be
almost invariably prohibited. Similarly, lookbacks that violate pri-
vacy guaranteed by states may be so costly as to be prohibited.81
Yet, lookback need not raise a constitutional claim to create
privacy costs. The constitutional right to privacy, as expressed by
the Supreme Court, reflects social norms and interests. These so-
cial norms dictate consideration of intrusions on a person's privacy
as a component of B, even when such intrusions are not unconsti-
NLRB, 440 US 301, 317-20 (1979) (upholding right to privacy for psychological testing re-
sults); Ramie v City of Hedwig Village, 765 F2d 490, 492 (5th Cir 1985) ("The disclosure
strand of the privacy interest... includes the right to be free from the government disclos-
ing private facts about its citizens and from the government inquiring into matters in which
it does not have a legitimate and proper concern.").
76 See United States v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F2d 570, 577 (3d Cir 1980)
(allowing limited discovery of employees' medical records where interests in discovery out-
weigh ordinary privacy protection afforded medical records); Carter v Broadlawns Medical
Center, 667 F Supp 1269, 1282 (S D Iowa 1987), modified on other grounds, 857 F2d 448
(8th Cir 1988) (right to privacy extends to patient records held by a county hospital), cert
denied, 489 US 1096 (1989); Shoemaker v Handel, 608 F Supp 1151, 1159 (D NJ 1985),
aft'd, 795 F2d 1136 (3d Cir 1986) (right to privacy extends to avoiding disclosure of "per-
sonal medical information," but must be weighed against competing state interest).
7 Bedford v Sugarman, 112 Wash 2d 500, 509, 772 P2d 486, 491 (1989).
78 Woods, 689 F Supp at 876. See also Doe v Borough of Barrington, 729 F Supp at 382
(disclosure of information about one's exposure to or infection with the AIDS virus is dis-
closure of a "personal matter" within the meaning of Whalen); Behringer, 592 A2d at 1271-
74. Courts have also determined that disclosure of the HIV status of blood donors violates
Whalen. See Doe v University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App 3d 227, 231-32, 538 NE2d 419,
423-24 (1988).
70 The Constitution, in general, controls government action, not private action.
80 Depending on where the physician practices or lives, both state and federal privacy
guarantees may be implicated. The privacy arguments under state constitutions generally
parallel those made under the United States Constitution. For a general discussion of the
privacy rights of HIV-positive health care workers, see Karen H. Rothenberg, et al, The
AIDS Project: Creating a Public Health Policy-Rights and Obligations of Health Care
Workers, 48 Md L Rev 93, 106-44 (1989).
81 States may provide broader protections for privacy rights than do federal statutes or
the Constitution. The Bill of Rights creates a "zone" of privacy, which states may broaden
but not restrict. See Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 482 (1965).
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tutional. In the negligence equation, B measures all costs, even if
those costs are not constitutionally cognizable.
For example, a lookback might implicate privacy rights even if
it was not conducted or authorized by a government actor. The
constitutional claim, whether or not directly applicable, provides a
metric against which courts can determine the costs of privacy vio-
lations. In those situations in which a lookback names an individ-
ual physician, courts should consider costs associated with invasion
of that physician's privacy rights as a major component of B.
Where the physician is not explicitly named, her privacy interest
may still be implicated if there is a substantial likelihood that dis-
closure of practice specialty, dates of practice, and location of prac-
tice would lead to the identification of the physician.
Theoretically, friends, associates, and sexual partners of HIV-
infected individuals may also suffer a loss of privacy if the identity
of the infected individual is disclosed. One court has held that
stigma "attaches not only to the AIDS victim, but to those in con-
tact with AIDS patients," including family members. s2 That court
held that a family member's AIDS status is personal.83 Courts
should vary their assessment of B depending on the differing pri-
vacy costs attributable to the lookback. Those costs should include
losses of privacy both to the physician and to others who suffer
privacy losses as a result of the lookback.
2. Costs of discrimination on the basis of disability.
In ruling on disclosure of the identities of HIV-infected health
care workers, the Leckelt and Behringer courts looked to federal
anti-discrimination legislation for guidance. Such legislation
reveals Congress's determination that discrimination on the basis
of an individual's disability gives rise to compensable damages. As
with the constitutional right to privacy, when lookbacks actually
violate an anti-discrimination statute, B may be so large as to pro-
hibit performance of the lookback altogether. Yet, a lookback need
not actually violate federal anti-discrimination law in order for it
to inflict substantial costs. Both the Federal Rehabilitation Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act establish a congressional
measure of the costs of discrimination for lookback.
a) The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The FRA
guarantees that federally funded programs and activities will not
82 Doe v Borough of Barrington, 729 F Supp at 384.
83 Id at 386.
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discriminate based on disability."4 The Department of Justice and
several courts have recognized all stages of HIV infection as a disa-
bility under the FRA.s5 Thus, where lookback provokes discrimina-
tion against an HIV-positive employee on the basis of disability,
the FRA may provide remedies to compensate discrimination
costs. The costs of these remedies must be factored into the B vari-
able in the negligence equation. 6 The FRA also forbids disability
discrimination in programs administered by an institution that re-
ceives federal funds, even if the particular discriminatory program
does not receive federal funds directly.8 7 Notably, most hospitals
receive Medicare or Medicaid funds from the federal government
and accordingly are covered by the FRA.88 Thus, any hospital,
health care institution, or state department of public health that
discloses its employees' HIV status may be violating the FRA, sub-
ject to the qualifications discussed below.
The Supreme Court has stated that, under the FRA, differen-
tial treatment is impermissible unless a person's handicap poses a
84 The FRA provides, in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of her or
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service.
29 USC § 794(a) (Supp 1990).
81 The FRA protects from discrimination "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29
USC § 706(8)(B) (Supp 1990). The FRA covers persons with AIDS. See Chalk v US Dist.
Court Cent. Dist. of California, 832 F2d 1158, 1158 (9th Cir 1987). At least one court has
concluded that the FRA protects asymptomatic HIV carriers. See Doe v Dolton Elementary
School District, 694 F Supp 440, 444-45 (N D Ill 1988). The Department of Justice has
stated that all HIV-infected persons are covered by the Act. See Department of Justice
Memorandum on the Application of Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act to HIV-
Infected Persons, 8 Lab Rel Rptr (BNA) § 405:1 (Sep 27, 1988).
86 FRA remedies include a private right of action, recovery of attorney's fees, and some-
times compensatory and punitive damages. See Pushkin v Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658
F2d 1372, 1376-80 (10th Cir 1981).
87 The law provides, that for purposes of determining programs or activities "receiving
financial assistance" under § 794(a), the term "program or activity" means
all of the operations of- . . an entire corporation.., or an entire sole proprietorship-
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation.., or sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing.., health care...
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
29 USC § 794(b)(3)(A) (Supp 1990) (emphasis added).
88 See United States v Baylor University Medical Ctr., 736 F2d 1039, 1040-41 (5th Cir
1984).
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significant risk to the health and safety of others.8 9 In determining
whether such a risk exists, courts "normally should defer to the
reasonable medical judgments of public health officials."90 Further,
the Supreme Court has stated that employers making job-related
decisions relying upon the infected status of an employee should
do so based on the risk of exposure inherent in a specific context.9 1
For lookback, the broader the disclosure, the less likely that the
lookback reflects a permissible differential treatment based on
"significant risk. ' 92
Litigation involving lookbacks provides additional guidance
for determining when the FRA provides a remedy for HIV status
discrimination. Importantly, no precedent establishes that look-
backs are not covered by the FRA. In Leckelt, the Fifth Circuit
dismissed Leckelt's FRA claim, but did so on grounds distinguisha-
ble from most lookback cases. The court found that Leckelt was
terminated from employment due to his failure to comply with
hospital policy and not solely because of the perception that he
was HIV-positive.9 3 Leckelt is different from the typical lookback
case because the plaintiff prevented disclosure by never turning
over the HIV antibody test results. As a result, Leckelt's FRA in-
quiry and the court only addressed the challenged termination and
not the hospital's request for his HIV test results.
Unlike Leckelt, Behringer represents a prototypical lookback
FRA inquiry. However, the case was filed in state court, and the
plaintiff's claims were based on state anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. The court never addressed the termination of the physician's
privileges at the Medical Center under federal anti-discrimination
89 School Board of Nassau County v Arline, 480 US 273, 287 n 16 (1987) (holding that
where a contagious person is also physically impaired, the court must conduct an individual-
ized inquiry with deference to reasonable medical judgments to determine if the contagious
person is "otherwise qualified" and therefore covered by the FRA).
90 Id at 288.
91 According to the Arline Court, risks are assessed according to "[findings of] facts,
based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the
nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is
the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third par-
ties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees
of harm." Id at 288. This statement suggests that a case-by-case risk assessment is required.
92 See Doe v Federal Bureau of Prisons, No 91-C-5013 (N D III, Aug 9, 1991), discussed
in 1991 AIDS Litigation Rep at 6833 (cited in note 48), which involved a broad lookback
that overlooked the significance of the safety risk. In Doe, the Bureau of Prisons sent letters
to 2,900 former patients of an HIV-infected doctor, without regard to the patient's risk of
HIV exposure, and issued a public press statement identifying the physician's medical
specialty.
93 Leckelt, 909 F2d at 826.
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provisions. As a result, no precedent directly establishes whether
lookback violates the FRA.94 At a minimum, then, an FRA claim is
still an available avenue for redress for a person whose HIV status
is revealed through a lookback.
b) Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The ADA
expands federal protection against disability discrimination, 5 in-
cluding discrimination based on HIV infection or on AIDS. 6 Un-
like the Federal Rehabilitation Act, the ADA applies to discrimi-
nating parties regardless of whether they receive federal funds or
qualify as federal agencies. Therefore, lookbacks that do not vio-
late the FRA may still violate the ADA.97 As the previous section
explains, an organization that does not generally reveal medical in-
formation about workers, but does so based on the worker's disa-
bility, may be subjecting its employee to discrimination on the ba-
sis of disability.
Lookbacks probably constitute judicially-recognizable disabil-
ity discrimination under the ADA. Both the FRA and the ADA
include HIV infection and AIDS as disabilities.9 8 EEOC regula-
tions emphasize that HIV infection in all its stages is "inherently
"4 In Doe v Bureau of Prisons, the plaintiff made an FRA claim which the court never
addressed. See 1991 AIDS Litigation Rep at 6833 (cited in note 48).
" 42 USC §§ 12101 et seq. The Act prohibits disability-based discrimination in employ-
ment (Title I), in the provision of public services (Title II), and by public accommodations
and services operated by private entities (Title III). The ADA's employment provisions be-
come effective July 26, 1992. The provisions for public services and public accommodations
became effective January 26, 1992. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") is responsible for administering Title I of the Act and has promulgated regula-
tions to implement the law. See 29 CFR §§ 1630 et seq (1991). The Department of Justice,
responsible for administering Titles II and M, has also issued implementing regulations. See
28 CFR §§ 35 et seq (1991) (Title II); 28 CFR §§ 36 et seq (1991) (Title III).
9" See note 101 and accompanying text.
17 In particular, the ADA is relevant where disclosure is made by an employer not cov-
ered by the FRA, or sometimes by a party other than the health care worker's employer.
Therefore, the ADA's protections against disclosure of the HIV status of infected health
care workers are wider in scope than the protections afforded by the FRA. For example, the
ADA makes it unlawful to "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere" with any individual
because the individual has exercised her rights under the ADA or helped others exercise
ADA rights. 42 USC § 12203(b). This provision may require that costs incurred by the indi-
vidual physician as a result of a co-worker's disclosure of the employee's HIV status be
included in the calculus.
" The intent to include HIV infection and AIDS is clearer under the ADA than under
the FRA. Whereas FRA caselaw developed to include HIV infection and AIDS-see note 85
and accompanying text-the federal regulations issued to interpret the ADA expressly in-
clude all stages of HIV disease.
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substantially limiting." 99 Both FRA case law'00 and congressional
intent'0 1 point to inclusion of HIV infection under the ADA as a
disability in every instance.
Additionally, relatives and associates of the disabled person
may raise a claim under the ADA; 02 the disclosure of private med-
ical information may damage an HIV-negative person's family
members. 10 3 Thus, the ADA reflects Congress's understanding that
discrimination suffered by family members-like the invasion of
those persons' privacy °4-must be included in evaluating total
costs of disclosure.
The ADA prohibits discriminatory action taken "because of"
the disability of a qualified employee. This standard is a signifi-
cantly lower barrier to recovery than that of the FRA. The FRA
states that discriminatory action cannot be taken "solely by reason
of" an individual's disability. Hence, under the FRA, a plaintiff
fails to state a claim when the discriminatory action arose from
mixed motives. 0 5 In contrast, under the ADA, plaintiffs arguably
can recover even where the motives underlying the disparate treat-
ment are not purely discriminatory.
The Leckelt court held that under the FRA, a hospital's policy
requesting that a nurse reveal his HIV status was justified because
the nurse posed a significant risk to patients. 106 The court balanced
the likelihood of transmission against the likelihood and magni-
tude of potential harm. Finding that the latter was significant, the
court determined that the hospital's policy did not violate the
FRA. Under the ADA, however, such balancing may not be permis-
g9 See EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 56 Fed Reg 35694 at 35741 (Jul 26, 1991) (adding
29 CFR § 1630).
100 FRA case law provides a minimum standard of protection for the ADA. 42 USC §
12201(a). See also Gregory Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship"
Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 Tulsa L J 1, 11-13 (1990).
101 See, for example, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, HR Rep No 485, 101st
Cong, 2d Sess 52 (1990) ("a person infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus is cov-
ered" because it substantially limits procreative and intimate sexual relationships); Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, S Rep No 116, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 20 (1989) (ADA
covers HIV infection).
'02 See 29 CFR § 1630.8 (cited in note 99), (preventing discrimination against a "quali-
fied individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified
individual is known to have a family, business, social, or other relationship or association").
103 See Doe v Borough of Barrington, 729 F Supp at 386.
'04 See text accompanying notes 73-83.
1'5 See, for example, Severino v North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F2d 1179,
1182-83 (11th Cir 1991); Norcross v Sneed, 573 F Supp 533, 543 (W D Ark 1983), aft'd, 755
F2d 113 (8th Cir 1985); Pierce v Engle, 726 F Supp 1231, 1234 (D Kan 1989).
100 Leckelt, 909 F2d at 833.
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sible. This suggests that Congress intended ADA violations to be
more costly than FRA violations.107
Apart from the question of a statutory violation, the more fun-
damental point remains. Federal and state legislatures have deter-
mined that discrimination on the basis of disability creates costs.
Aside from the question of whether a lookback is a statutory viola-
tion, it may create costs that must be included in the evaluation of
the total costs of the lookback.
3. Costs recoverable in tort.
The following sections discuss whether damages due to dis-
closure are compensable under tort law. Where an individual raises
a tort claim, the lookback may create costs even if those costs are
not compensable in law. While the previous section focussed on
costs imposed on the HIV-infected employee, the individuals noti-
fied incur costs as well. This discussion provides a framework for
determining when courts should award damages to these individu-
als for emotional distress and loss of consortium. Whether or not
injuries sustained as a result of lookback are recoverable in tort,
the costs of emotional distress and loss of consortium must be in-
cluded in the costs of lookback, even for persons who never actu-
ally contract HIV or AIDS. As with privacy rights and anti-dis-
crimination legislation, a legal remedy is not a prerequisite to an
economic analysis that accounts for disclosure costs. Rather, an
evaluation of potential remedies helps provide courts with an indi-
cia of costs associated with disclosure.
a) Emotional distress. Disclosing a physician's HIV sta-
tus may inflict emotional distress upon those patients who learn
they might be HIV-positive. These emotional costs of the disclos-
ure must be included in the valuation of a lookback's burden.
However, if the number of people notified that they may have been
exposed relative to the number who actually do turn out to be
HIV-positive is large, the overall cost of emotional distress might,
on that basis alone, outweigh the benefits from the lookback.
Damages for emotional distress are a common judicial remedy.
Some courts award damages for emotional and mental distress
107 The claim that the balancing found in Leckelt would not be permissible under the
ADA can also be made by relying on an interpretation of the "direct threat" defense
presented in Timothy Bishop, Discrimination Against Persons with HIV Disease: The
Americans with Disabilities Act, in Paul Albert, ed, National Lawyers Guild AIDS Practice
Manual (National Lawyers Guild, forthcoming) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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even absent an accompanying physical injury or illness.108 This de-
parture makes it easier for patients-including those who never
test positive for HIV-to be awarded damages for emotional dis-
tress resulting from treatment by an HIV-positive physician. If a
physical injury rule is not required, then all patients of HIV-posi-
tive health care workers notified in a lookback may have a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress by proving
duty, breach, causation, and damages.109 Further, emotional dis-
tress may lead to anxiety disorders, a physical manifestation that
makes negligence easier to prove. 110  Two recent suits
sought-albeit unsuccessfully-emotional distress damages that
stem from mere knowledge of a former physician's death from
AIDS."' A court conducting a negligence inquiry with regard to
the disclosure should consider the emotional distress of those noti-
fied as part of the cost of the lookback.
b) Loss of consortium. Patients and spouses of patients
treated by HIV-infected health care workers may make claims for
loss of consortium. Loss of consortium is a derivative claim that
arises from a primary negligence action; the defendant's duty of
reasonable care to the impaired spouse transfers to the spouse de-
prived of consortium. The claim includes interference with the
marriage contract as evidenced by loss of support, affection, soci-
ety, companionship, and loss of sexual intercourse." 2 A plaintiff
could claim that the potential of testing positive for HIV in the
future prohibited her from having safe, unprotected sexual inter-
course indefinitely." 3 Limitations in the technology to test for HIV
108 See, for example, Corgan v Conrad Muehling, 143 Ill 2d 296, 574 NE2d 602, 607-09
(1991) (though physical symptoms establish objective evidence of harm, absence of physical
symptoms is not a justifiable reason to preclude recovery for emotional distress).
109 See id at 606, citing Kirk v Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill 2d
507, 525 (1987).
110 Id at 608-09.
... Rossi v Almaraz, No 90344028 (Md Cir Ct for Baltimore City, May 23, 1991), and
Faya v Almaraz, No 90345011 (Md Cir Ct for Baltimore City, May 23, 1991), were filed by
former patients against a surgeon's estate after Johns Hopkins University Hospital con-
ducted a broad lookback following the surgeon's death. The court did not address the ap-
propriateness of the lookback, but confined its analysis to damages. Both cases were dis-
missed on summary judgment motions. However, these dismissals were not based on
Maryland's rule preventing recovery for emotional distress absent physical injury. Rather,
the court relied on a special rule: in cases involving the fear of contracting disease, plaintiffs
must prove exposure.
112 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 8.9 at
550 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1986).




leave open the possibility of never-ending uncertainty as to infec-
tion status.114 Damages for loss of consortium may increase the
cost of a lookback even where notified patients never test positive
for HIV. Moreover, all claims raised in tort, whether or not judi-
cially remediable, can create costs relevant to the valuation of the
costs of a lookback.
4. Systemic costs.
Systemic costs, though difficult to evaluate, probably comprise
the most significant portion of lookback costs. This section surveys
and highlights costs that may result and will be borne by the soci-
ety generally. These societal costs include costs to persons who are
not directly affected by the lookback, that is, any persons who do
not receive notification that they have been treated by an HIV-
infected physician.
The first potential cost is an irrational distrust of the medical
system that could lead to inefficient uses of health care resources.
Though it may be difficult to figure out precisely what the burden
is on society as a result of this cost, it may be significant. One
could imagine that individuals might forgo medical treatments,
which are otherwise recommended, because of a fear of contracting
HIV.11 5 Alternatively, patients may make decisions to avoid being
treated by doctors who they perceive pose a risk of infection; often
these decisions may not have any rational basis. 116 Doctors too,
may make decisions not to treat patients based either on irrational
fears of contracting the virus or as a response to economic pressure
from their clientele.11 7 The existence of lookback sends an implicit
"' See note 2.
"x One dentist noted a decline in patients who seek dental care, a decline presumably
attributable to a fear of contracting AIDS. See Jeffrey M. Gold, Letter to the Editor, Fear of
AIDS Keeps Dentist Chairs Empty, NY Times, D14 (Nov 3, 1991). See also Mireya
Navarro, Patients Grilling Health Workers on AIDS, NY Times BI (Aug 2, 1991) (Some
doctors and dentists believe that patients delay procedures and treatment because of fear of
HIV infection. Dentists in the New York metropolitan area reported cancellations after the
newspapers reported about the death of an HIV-infected dentist.).
"' Some patients rely on personal information about health care workers to judge the
risk level of contracting HIV from the health care worker. Some doctors report being asked
whether they are married. One presumes that patients who ask this question seek to avoid
treatment from gay doctors. See Navarro, NY Times B1. Consider too the recent spate of
"I-800-DENTIST" commercials on television, in which the information provider discusses a
dentist's marital status with callers. These commercials play on stereotypes and irrational
fears about gay men and AIDS.
I" See Jon Van, Scarlet Letters for Doctors: AIDS, Chi Trib C13 (Jun 8, 1989) (con-
trary to the opinion of public health authorities, 25% of persons polled would change doc-
tors if they learned their current doctor was treating AIDS patients).
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message to health care consumers that the medical establishments
themselves perceive a substantial risk of HIV transmission as a re-
sult of health care.
Another potential societal cost of lookback would be the crea-
tion of a disincentive for medical workers to notify hospitals of
their HIV infection status. Furthermore, as a result of lookback
policies, physicians would be discouraged from voluntarily test-
ing.118 Particularly where lookbacks result in economic losses to the
physician, either as a loss of income,11 9 or as a loss because of un-
employment or altered employment, the physician would avoid any
possibility of finding out her HIV status.
Finally, lookbacks could result in widespread disregard for
safer sexual practices resulting in further spread of the virus. 20
Currently, educational efforts are a primary means of preventing
HIV. However, even the broadest, most intrusive lookbacks cannot
ensure 100% notification of persons facing increased risk from ex-
posure in a health care setting. 2 ' For example, a patient who is
treated at a hospital that routinely performs lookbacks may cor-
rectly assume that she will be notified if the hospital discovers that
the treating physician is HIV-positive. As a result, she will not al-
ter her behavior if she does not hear otherwise from the hospital.
However, her behavior may reflect under-prevention, according to
the patient's own evaluation of the appropriate prevention level,'22
either because the hospital does not know the accurate HIV status
of the physician or the limits of the testing technology prevent an
accurate determination of the physician's HIV status. Any dimin-
See, for example, Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation of
AIDS, (unpublished manuscript, Dec 16, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (arguing that
penalties such as loss of jobs, life and medical insurance, operate as a tax on voluntary
testing).
"" This type of loss was experienced by the physician in Behringer.
120 Professor Philipson and Judge Posner divide the world into egoists and altruists. An
altruist is a person who, if she knows she is HIV-positive will engage in only safer sex, in
order to protect her partner. The egoist, on the other hand, cares not at all for the safety of
her partner. The HIV-positive egoist will always choose to engage in unsafe sex. The HIV-
negative egoist will engage in safer sex if she believes she is at risk from her partner; and she
generally cannot trust that her partner will notify her as to risk factor. Philipson and Posner
conclude that anything that increases the number of egoists who are tested for the AIDS
virus is questionable from a social standpoint. See Philipson and Posner, Optimal Regula-
tion of AIDS (cited in note 118). One could extend this analysis to the lookback case. Look-
backs will not affect the altruist's behavior, which is already protective of her partner. How-
ever, lookbacks will increase the number of egoists who get tested and could therefore
exacerbate the spread of HIV.
121 See note 2 and accompanying text.
122 This argument assumes that a person would want to increase use of HIV prevention
methods if at a higher risk of infection, in order to protect her partner.
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ished emphasis on safer sexual practices that results from reliance
on lookbacks will create costs to society.
As the blood transfusion cases illustrate, courts consider the
systemic costs of and society's interests in disclosure. In fact, the
Rasmussen court viewed "society's interest in a strong and healthy
blood supply" as the dispositive issue in the case.12 3 Similarly,
courts should find that the societal effects and costs of disclosing
the identities of HIV-infected health care workers are relevant to
cost-benefit analysis.
B. Losses Prevented by Lookback Multiplied by the Probability
of Harm (P*L)
An economic analysis of lookback would compare total costs
with the value of the losses prevented by disclosure. This section
evaluates the probability of a loss where no lookback has been con-
ducted, and the magnitude of that loss should it occur.
For patients who have actually confracted HIV through expo-
sure to an HIV-positive health care worker, lookbacks and notifica-
tion may provide opportunities for early medical intervention,
which can extend the lifespan of the patient. Lookbacks may also
prevent subsequent transmissions to third parties by patients in-
fected by an HIV-positive health care worker.1 24 The maximum
loss associated with such a transmission would be the death of the
individual to whom the infected patient transmitted the disease. A
factor as weighty as otherwise preventable death significantly af-
fects the balance. In evaluating the total costs that society would
suffer if a lookback is not conducted (P*L), however, courts must
look not only at the loss (L), but also at the probability (P) that
the loss will occur. If the P multiplier is low, B might outweigh
P*L even if L is high.
1. Risk to persons associated with a former patient of an
HIV-infected health care worker.
In most cases, lookbacks help primarily those who are not
HIV-positive at the time of the lookback but who are in danger of
being exposed to the HIV virus. The best example of lookback
beneficiaries are the sexual partners of patients exposed to the
123 Rasmussen, 500 S2d at 538.
124 See Gostin, 48 Md L Rev at 21 (cited in note 57) (comparing risk of transmission
from health care professional to patient with risk of transmission from patient to health
care professional).
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HIV-positive health care worker. In order to evaluate the risk of
transmission from the patient to any third party-secondary risk
probability-a discussion of the risk of transmission from health
care worker to patient-primary risk probability-is necessary.
The risk to third parties is equal to the primary risk probability
multiplied by the secondary risk probability. 125
a) Primary risk probability. Despite ten years of experi-
ence with HIV infections, the Florida dentist case remains the only
known instance of transmission of HIV from physician to pa-
tient.126 Retrospective studies of the patients of HIV-infected
health care workers as well as studies performed after lookbacks
confirm this finding. 127
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has issued a draft doc-
ument that quantifies the risk of HIV transmission from dentist to
patient.12s As a preliminary matter, health care workers who use
universal precautions 29 and do not perform invasive procedures 30
125 For a comprehensive discussion of this formula, see Mark Barnes, et al, The HIV-
Infected Health Care Professional: Employment Policies and Public Health, 18 L, Med
and Health Care 311 (1990).
126 The CDC used DNA samples to link the strains of the virus in three of the dentist's
patients to the dentist's strain. Centers for Disease Control, Update: Transmission of HIV
Infection During an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida, 40 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly
Rpt, No 23, 21 (June 14, 1991). Based on DNA sequencing and the absence of other risk
factors for these patients, the CDC concluded that these three patients became HIV in-
fected while receiving care from the dentist. This dentist had a history of poor sterilization
practices, using his own equipment to treat himself after being diagnosed HIV positive, and
not changing gloves between patients. Id at 25-26. See also Barbara Gerbert, et al, Possible
Health Care Professional-to-Patient HIV Transmission, 265 j Am Med Ass'n 1845, 1847
(1991).
127 Ban Mishu, et al, A Surgeon with AIDS: Lack of Evidence of Transmission to Pa-
tients, 264 J Am Med Ass'n 467 (1990) (after testing 616 of a surgeon's 2160 identified
patients, CDC concluded that none had acquired HIV from the surgeon); Jeffrey J. Sacks,
AIDS in a Surgeon, 313 New Eng J Med 1017 (1985) (none of 400 patients of Florida sur-
geon was listed in the Florida AIDS Registry); Frances Armstrong, Judson Miner, and Wil-
liam Wolfe, Investigation of a Health Care Worker with Symptomatic Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection: An Epidemiologic Approach, 152 Military Med 414 (1987) (76
patients of HIV-infected surgeon sought testing and none tested positive for HIV); Porter,
et al, Management of Patients Treated by a Surgeon with HIV Infection, 1 The Lancet 113
(1990) (76 of 339 patients of surgeon asked for testing; none was HIV-infected).
12I Centers for Disease Control, DRAFT: Estimates of the Risk of Endemic Transmis-
sion of Hepatitis B Virus and Human Immunodeficiency Virus to Patients by the Percuta-
neous Route During Invasive Surgical and Dental Procedures, (Jan 30, 1991) ("DRAFT")
(on file with U Chi L Rev). The courts, as a descriptive matter, pay deference to CDC
estimates, in part because they are admissible under a hearsay exception for government
documents. Courts should also hear expert testimony to ensure accurate estimates of trans-
mission risks.
2 "Universal precautions" are defined in Centers for Disease Control, Recommenda-
tions for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Vi-
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present no risk of HIV transmission to patients. The CDC esti-
mates that during "dental procedures performed by a dentist or
oral surgeon which predictably result in patient bleeding, ' 13 1 the
risk that a patient will be infected by an HIV-positive dentist
ranges from 1 in 263,158 to 1 in 2,631,579.132 The risk that a pa-
tient will be infected by an HIV-positive surgeon ranges from 1 in
41,667 to 1 in 416,667.133 Based on these figures, the CDC esti-
mates that during the years 1981-1990 only between ten and one
hundred patients were infected with HIV by dentists.13 4 Courts
should be wary, however: the CDC noted that its ability to esti-
mate risk in the dental-care setting was hampered by "the lack of
prospective studies of the frequency of percutaneous injuries in
[dental] workers and the percent of such injuries which result in
possible exposure of a patient to the worker's blood.1"' s Addition-
ally, many have criticized the CDC study136 and its underlying as-
sumptions.137 Critics suggest the actual instances of transmission
are much lower. No other official report attempts to quantify the
rus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 Morbidity and Mortality
Wkly Rpt, No RR-8, 1, 2 (Jul 12, 1991).
"I0 Invasive procedures involve "surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair
of major traumatic injuries." CDC, 36 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly Rpt Supp at 6 (cited
in note 5).
' CDC, DRAFT at 1 n a (cited in note 128).
132 Id at 8.
133 Id at 7.
13, Id at Table 2.
135 Id at 8.
"I Dr. Henry Finger, President of the Academy of General Dentistry, criticized as too
high an estimate of patient risk presented in the CDC's draft document in a March 11, 1991
letter to the CDC, which is discussed in Zev Remba, HIV, 1991 AGD Impact 16, 20 (June).
"37 Testifying through one of its members at the CDC Conference on Health Care
Worker Guidelines (Feb 21, 1991), the AIDS Action Council ("AAC") argued that the CDC's
study relies on unfounded assumptions. The AAC contended the CDC has no basis for its
assumption that sharp instruments or needles that cause percutaneous injury to the dentist
recontact the patient at a 32% rate. Ruth Finkelstein, AIDS Action Council Testimony
Presented to the Centers for Disease Control (Feb 21, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
This figure was derived by CDC observers conducting a prospective investigation of surgical
procedures at four hospitals. Because of the vast range of recontact rates noted in CDC's
small sample (range among medical specialties, 8% - 57%; range among hospitals, 24% -
42%), the 32% figure is problematic even for surgery. The AAC also criticized the CDC
modelling assumptions, which relied on studies spanning a ten-year period, and ignored
changes in the use of universal precautions. Id at 3-5.
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primary risk probability."3 8 By all reports, the probability that any
patient will contract HIV from an infected physician is very low.
b) Risk of transmission from HIV-infected patient to a
third party. For secondary HIV transmission, the primary means
of transmission are sexual contact, needle-sharing, and a fetus's
contact with an HIV-infected mother.3 Although evidence sug-
gests that the likelihood of transmission increases with frequency
of exposure, 40 the probability of transmission for any single in-
stance of exposure is uncertain although some researchers have
tried to quantify the risk.'4 '
Notably, casual contact is not a mode of HIV transmission.
HIV cannot be transmitted through food handling. 42 Personal ser-
1S Reports state that the risk to a surgeon from operating on an HIV-infected patient
ranges from 1 in 4,500 to 1 in 130,000. See Michael Hagen, Klemens Meyer, and Stephen
Pauker, Routine Preoperative Screening for HIV: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh
the Risk to the Patient?, 259 J Am Medical Ass'n 1357, 1358 (1988) ("That there would be
far fewer instances of health care worker to patient transmission than of transmission from
patient to health care worker would be expected."). See also Barnes, et al, 18 L, Med and
Health Care at 312 (cited in note 125).
139 See Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling
and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity and Mortality
Wkly Rpt No 31, 509 (Aug 14, 1987).
140 See Thomas A. Peterman and James W. Curran, Sexual Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 256 J Am Medical Ass'n 2222 (1986).
141 One study calculated the following levels of risk of contracting HIV:
One encounter with an individual whose HIV status is unknown and who is not in a
high-risk group for HIV:
with condom use-1 in 50 million
without condom use-1 in 5 million
500 encounters with an individual whose HIV status is unknown and who is not in a
high-risk group for HIV:
with condom use-1 in 110,000
without condom use-1 in 16,000
One encounter with an individual whose HIV status is unknown and who is in a high-
risk group for HIV:
with condom use-1 in 100,000 to 1 in 10,000
without condom use-1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000
500 encounters with an individual whose HIV status is unknown and who is in a high-
risk group for HIV:
with condom use-1 in 210 to I in 21
without condom use-1 in 32 to 1 in 3
One encounter with an HIV-positive individual:
with condom use-1 in 5,000
without condom use-1 in 500
Norman Hearst and Stephen B. Hulley, Preventing the Heterosexual Spread of AIDS, 259
J Am Medical Ass'n 2428, 2429 (1988).
142 The ADA requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") cre-
ate a list of diseases which may be transmitted through food handling. HHS's list, does not
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vice workers with HIV also provide no risk of transmission. 143
Studies reveal that persons with HIV pose no risk to the family
members or health care professionals who provide their daily
care.
1 4 4
2. Possibilities and benefits of early intervention and
notification.
Lookback and notification inform patients of their possible ex-
posure to HIV. As a result of this information, a patient who has
been infected by a health care provider may seek to avoid trans-
mission to third parties by avoiding known high-risk activities.
This individual may also seek to reduce the cost of exposure to
herself through medical intervention, which has been shown to in-
crease the lifespan of HIV-infected persons.145 Similarly, any indi-
vidual who has been exposed to an HIV-infected patient may also
choose early medical intervention. Future research may reveal that
medical intervention can significantly decrease the cost of loss as-
sociated with contracting HIV. Given existing technology, the ben-
efits of early intervention are minimal. Courts, however, should
consider current research on early interventions as relevant to the
cost-benefit analysis.
IV. BALANCING THE EQUATION
Courts should recognize that disclosure introduces costs to in-
dividuals and to society, and presents benefits that vary with the
procedures performed by HIV-infected health care workers. The
magnitude of the costs of a lookback will vary on a case-by-case
include HIV infection or AIDS. See Diseases Transmitted Through the Food Supply, 56
Fed Reg 40897 (Aug 16, 1991).
,43 The latest CDC guidelines state that HIV-infected individuals whose jobs involve
close personal contact with clients, such as hairdressers, barbers, estheticians, cosmetolo-
gists, manicurists, pedicurists and massage therapists, pose no threat in the absence of other
infections or illnesses for which any personal service worker should also be restricted. See
CDC, 36 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly Rpt Supp 2 at 8 (cited in note 5).
'" See Gostin, 48 Md L Rev at 33 (cited in note 57).
146 See Gerald H. Friedland, Early Treatment for HIV: The Time Has Come, 322 New
Eng J Med 1000, 1001 (1990) (The initiation of zidovudine ("AZT") therapy in HIV-positive
patients with no symptoms of AIDS significantly delayed the onset of AIDS). Note, how-
ever, that AZT therapy has accompanying side effects. No consensus exists regarding pro-
phylactic use of AZT by HIV-negative persons who are at risk of HIV infection. See Centers
for Disease Control, Public Health Service Statement on Management of Occupational Ex-
posure to Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Including Considerations Regarding
Zidovudine Postexposure Use, 39 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly Rpt No RR-1, 1, 7-8 (Jan
26, 1990).
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basis. The cost of privacy invasion, for example, depends on the
degree and type of disclosure. The benefits vary depending on the
individualized risk of transmission of HIV to a patient. Variables
that affect risk include the type of procedure performed, 46 use of
universal precautions, and known instances of accidents that may
increase the risk.14
7
Due to the high costs of disclosing an individual's HIV infec-
tion status-including invasion of privacy, costs of discrimination,
costs sounding in tort, and systemic costs-relative to the low
probability of transmission, lookback notification is not appropri-
ate in most cases: its costs generally outweigh the losses it would
prevent. However, courts may appropriately allow or require look-
backs when the evidence demonstrates an increased probability of
transmission. The following practices or occurrences suggest an in-
creased probability of transmission: (1) failure to follow accepted
infection control practices, (2) identified instances of blood-to-
blood contact through needlesticks, (3) accidental injury to a phy-
sician during an invasive procedure, and (4) the presence of lesions
or open sores on a physician during a procedure.148
When the evidence suggests a high probability of transmission
from the physician to identified patients, courts should require
that those patients, and only those patients, be notified. Moreover,
courts should require modified notifications, restricting the infor-
mation included in the disclosure, except when full disclosure is
absolutely necessary.149 In the blood transfusion cases, courts have
14' The CDC has left it to medical organizations and institutions to identify specific
procedures as "exposure prone." CDC, 40 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly Rpt No RR-8 at 4
(cited in note 129). Note that the CDC and the professional organizations could not agree on
a list of high-risk procedures. The CDC has abandoned its efforts to create such a list. See
Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Backs Off on Plan to Restrict Health Workers With AIDS Vi-
rus, NY Times Al (Dec 4, 1991).
147 Accidents that increase the risk of HIV transmission include needlesticks and con-
tact with an HIV-infected health care worker's open sores.
148 Available evidence supports disclosure in the case of the Florida dentist who alleg-
edly transmitted HIV to his patients. Accounts and records show that he failed to follow
accepted infection control practices and repeatedly treated his own lesions with office in-
struments and did not later sterilize the equipment. See note 126 and accompanying text.
148 In Doe v Federal Bureau of Prisons, the plaintiff was the only dentist at the named
facility for at least seven years. When the individual was identified by his profession, his
name was not necessary to identify him. See 1991 Aids Litigation Rep at 6833 (cited in note
48). This case provides an example of when modified disclosure-blocking release of the
plaintiff's medical specialty-could have significantly reduced the costs of the disclosure
while maintaining the same level of benefit.
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achieved analogous results by crafting modified discovery orders
subject to judicial oversight. 150
The application of the framework developed in this Comment
suggests that the outcomes of several of the lookback cases were
wrong. In Leckelt, the court acknowledged that the health care
worker's HIV status was private except insofar as the information
was needed by hospital personnel to protect the health of employ-
ees and patients. 5 1 Had the Leckelt court relied on the model pro-
posed by this Comment, it would first have undertaken an individ-
ualized risk assessment, and only then allowed limited disclosure
to hospital personnel on an "as needed" basis with assurances for
confidentiality. Absent assurances for confidentiality, the court
should not have allowed the disclosure.
In Doe v Bureau of Prisons, although the prison itself ac-
knowledged that an effective response required notification of only
a handful of former patients, 152 the Federal Bureau of Prisons is-
sued a press release. The scope of disclosure was particularly over-
broad, especially considering that this health care worker had pro-
vided medical care only to a closely controlled, known population
and not to the general population. Courts should limit disclosure
to patients with an identifiable high risk of exposure.
CONCLUSION
Increasingly, courts are asked to establish the contours of pub-
lic access to information regarding the HIV-infection status of
health care workers. No coherent standard has yet emerged to
guide the courts in making these decisions. This Comment's model
and proposed economic analysis of the costs and benefits of look-
back may prove useful in setting the level of due care in negligence
actions. If accepted by the courts, the economic model would en-
courage hospitals and health care organizations to perform look-
backs only when they are economically efficient.
The standard that courts choose to apply will determine how
zealously individuals' privacy rights are protected and will affect
150 See Boutte, 127 FRD at 126; Belle Bonfils, 763 P2d at 1013; Mason, 121 FRD at
303.
,6, Leckelt, 909 F2d at 833.
152 The CDC recommended notification of several patients, including one patient dur-
ing whose treatment the dentist sustained a needlestick injury. In addition, the CDC recom-
mended that patients treated during a one to two week period in which the dentist exhib-
ited a skin condition be notified, counseled, and offered testing for HIV infection. Centers
for Disease Control, Preliminary Summary of an Investigation of U.S. Public Health Ser-
vice Dentist with HIV Infection 5 (Aug 8, 1991) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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society's efforts to control the spread of a deadly virus. Decisions
made in the courts will also affect legislatures and health care in-
stitutions. Each lookback decision should balance all costs to the
individual and society against the benefits of disclosure. Courts
should ultimately make the cost efficient choice based on accurate
medical information.
